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In an attempt to ensure enforcement of law, international bodies have
developed a practice of collective non-recognition in response to serious
violations of international law. This Article seeks to bring some clarity to
the practice of non-recognition. Through analysis of International Court of
Justice cases and State practice, the Article demonstrates a legally binding,
but not acknowledged shift in the law that governs non-recognition. Then,
moving beyond strict legal analysis, the Article expresses policy concerns
with the current legal status of the obligation and proposes how States
should legally respond.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Laws can grant privileges or create obligations, and, in either case, the
law sets the limit of permissible action.1 Since men are not angels but social
beings, a successful legal system must address how members are to behave
when they confront violators.2 In the international legal system, where there
is no single functioning legal enforcer, States’ need for guidance is all the
greater.3 With over one hundred and fifty members in the international
community, of which many of which have sizable militaries and economic
power, there looms the danger that a local dispute could become
internationalized if the law deputizes all States.4 However, labeling all
States that are aware of violations as innocent bystanders, who are not
permitted to intervene, is no less troublesome.5 While such an approach
may restrain conflict from spreading, it does so at the cost of handicapping
enforcement and thereby institutionalizing injustice.6
Confronted with this reality and trying to ensure enforcement of the law
without multiplying conflicts, international bodies developed a practice of
collective non-recognition in response to serious violations of international
law.7 For example, in response to Japan’s illegal invasion of Manchuria and
establishment of the puppet State of Manchukuo in 1931, the Assembly of
the League of Nations declared that it was “incumbent upon the Members of
1. See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity of Private Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2
(2011) (“Private law presents itself in normative language. Judicial decisions in private law cases are
replete with references to ‘duties,’ ‘obligations,’ ‘rights,’ ‘wrongs’ and so on. This language presumes
that private law tells citizens how they ought to behave. It is striking, therefore, that contemporary legal
theorists often explain and evaluate private law with little, if any, reference to normativity.”).
2. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1801-02 (2009) (alteration in original)
(“[L]egal systems solve the problem of ‘uncertainty’ by providing institutions and procedures for
resolving what counts as law, ‘either by reference to an authoritative text or to an official whose
declarations on this point are authoritative.’ Hart famously described how mature legal systems
accomplish this task through ‘secondary rules’ of recognition, change, and adjudication that determine
what the primary legal rules are and when they have been violated.”).
3. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
54 INT’L ORG. 421, 427 (2000) (“Violations weaken the international legal system and are self-defeating,
at least over time.”).
4. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 2, at 1793.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 24 (1987).
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the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement
which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the
League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.”8 Similarly, after the minority
white government of Southern Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence
from the United Kingdom, the Security Council called for all States not to
recognize, render assistance to, or entertain diplomatic or other relations
with Rhodesia.9 During the last fifty years, the Security Council called
upon all States to not recognize Iraq’s declaration of an eternal merger with
Kuwait,10 and scholars have debated the principle of non-recognition in
relation to current events in Ukraine as well as Georgia.11
This Article seeks to bring some clarity to the principle of nonrecognition. First, through analysis of International Court of Justice (“ICJ”
or “Court”) cases and State actions, the Article traces the development of
the principle of non-recognition.12
Second, with this development
delineated, the Article demonstrates a legally binding, but not
acknowledged, shift in law.13 This shift is from a principle that applied to
all States only after an authoritative determination was made to a principle
that applies when certain objective requirements are met.14 Given the long
history of the principle and its ongoing functionality, it is likely the shift in

8. Id. at 30. Some have questioned the Manchuria Incident as an example of states practicing
the obligation of non-recognition. See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(AMS Press 1978) (1947) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION].
9. S.C. Res. 216, ¶¶ 1-2 (Nov. 12, 1965). The use of the term “illegitimate authority” in the
prohibition may seem tied to the illegitimacy of the Rhodesian government and not the illegitimacy of
the State; however, it has been convincingly argued that this interpretation is incorrect. DUGARD, supra
note 7, at 93-94.
10. S.C. Res. 662, ¶ 2 (Aug. 9, 1990).
11. See, e.g., Anna Dolidze, Ukraine Insta-Symposium: Potential Non-recognition of Crimea,
OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:29 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/17/ukraine-insta-symposiumpotential-non-recognition-crimea/.
12. See infra Parts II.B and III.B.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See, e.g., James Crawford, Trades Union Cong., Opinion: Third Party Obligations with
Respect to Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 1, 16, ¶¶ 40-41 (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/tucfiles/ (arguing that the erga omnes obligations identified in
the Wall Case do not compel states to behave in a particular way) [hereinafter Crawford]; Alison Pert,
The “Duty” of Non-recognition in Contemporary International Law: Issues and Uncertainties, 2014
CHINA (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 1, 13 (2014) (focusing primarily on the ILC serves to
demonstrate that the obligation depends upon an authoritative determination). See also Stefan Talmon,
The Duty Not to ‘Recognize as Lawful’ a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of Force or Other Serious
Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation: An Obligation Without Real Substance?, in THE FUNDAMENTAL
RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 99, 121-22 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin
eds., 2005) (alteration in original) (“The first difficulty [of the principle of non-recognition] is knowing
when the obligation will arise.”). Then, without reference to the Wall Advisory Case or any other
binding source, Talmon correctly concluded that the obligation does not legally depend upon an
authoritative determination. Id.
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law will be extended to other contexts.15 Thus, this Article moves beyond
strict legal analysis to expose policy concerns with the current legal status
of the obligation.16 Finally, the Article proposes that the international
community should legally respond to the current status by adopting a
moderate approach to non-recognition.17 This moderate approach would
allow States to justify their own actions if the requirements of the nonrecognition obligation are met, but it does not require a State to act until an
authoritative determination is made.18
This Article is not the first effort to bring order to the principle of nonrecognition. In an attempt to provide a codified rule for States, the
International Law Commission’s (ILC) 2001 Report on The Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Report”) declares, “[n]o State
shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach. . .nor
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”19 However, despite
the ILC’s monumental effort to codify third-party States’ obligations, the
requirements which stem from the obligation remain unclear, as do the
circumstances in which the obligation arises.20
First, an obligation may be negative or positive.21 A negative obligation
requires States not to perform certain acts, while a positive obligation
15. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 200-01, ¶¶161-62 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Case].
The “shift in law” discussed below takes place in the highly controversial ICJ advisory opinion Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (“Wall Case”), yet it
does not follow that others will extend the case to other contexts. See id. First, the opinion provides no
legal justification for restricting the ICJ’s decision solely to Israel. See id. Second, as discussed below,
many scholars prior to the Wall Case advanced its conception of the principle of non-recognition. See
id. Thus, the ICJ’s shift in the law has academic support. See id. More importantly, there is no shortage
of entities seeking recognition or arguing against recognition, which stands to benefit from a proper
understanding of the case. As Sir Arthur Watts writes, “Palestine is in many respects sui generis, there
are passages in the ICJ’s treatment of the status of Palestine and the Palestinians, either expressly or by
implication, which will resonate with other entities.” Sir Arthur Watts, Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion
(Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory), THE MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L LAW ¶ 45 (2007), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e150. With the prospect of benefiting from the Wall Advisory
Case, these entities will marshal the case to their respective advantage. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. Rep.
at 200-01, ¶¶161-62. Thus, if the shift brought about in the Wall Case does not have lasting significance
in international law, the reason will be political—not legal. See id. In any event, even if others do not
apply the holding of the Wall Case in other cases, it is important to delineate the political possibilities
from the legal logic behind the cases. See id.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at
53-54 (2001) [hereinafter Report] (alteration in original).
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., JEAN-FRANÇOIS AKANDJI-KOMBE, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (2007) [hereinafter POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS].
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instructs States on what ought to be done.22 With regard to the requirements
following from the principle of non-recognition, the ILC states that the
principle imposes a “duty of abstention” and consists of a requirement of
non-recognition as well as its “logical extension” not to render aid or
assistance in maintaining the situation.23 The ILC clearly holds that the
obligation of non-recognition imposes a negative obligation.24 However,
this description does little to clarify the content of the negative obligation.25
The ILC only provides limited explanation of what non-recognition entails
and no boundaries are drawn on what counts as “assisting to maintain an
illegal situation.”26 Nor does the ILC explain its non-elaboration on the
content of the obligation.27 In fact, the lack of clarity provided by the
Report in part led States to issue divergent comments on the codification of
a principle of non-recognition.28
Second, the concept of negative and positive obligations addresses the
content of an obligation, but is silent on when such an obligation arises.29
Under a declarative approach, no obligation exists absent an authoritative
body recognizing that the obligation applies.30 At the other end of the
spectrum, a constitutive approach to the obligation of non-recognition holds
that the obligation is “self-standing”—applying to all States once certain
objective requirements are met.31 In between these two extremes, the
moderate approach allows a State to justify its own actions if the
requirements of the obligation are met, but it does not require a State to act
until an authoritative determination is made.32
22. See, e.g., id.
23. Report, supra note 19, at 53-54, 287, 291.
24. Id. at 289.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 287, 289, 459.
27. See id.
28. State Responsibility Comments and Observations Received from Governments, 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 64, 70, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515, 64, 70 (concluding that the obligation of non-recognition added
nothing of substance to the Report and therefore suggested deleting it). In contrast, the United States felt
more limitations needed to be placed on the obligation and lamented that the obligation of nonrecognition, along with the other parts of Articles 41 and 42, were inappropriate given the existence of
the Security Council and the International Criminal Court. See id. at 69. France and the United States
were not alone in expressing concern regarding the content of the obligation. To clarify the section of
the Report, Spain complained that the ILC should “streamline the content of the obligation not to
recognize as lawful the situation created by the breach[.]” See id. at 64, 70. Reading the same
document, the United Kingdom came to a different conclusion, complaining that the obligation of nonrecognition in the Report in relation to other rules presented was an “inflexible rule” which wrongly
mandated “the application of the same approach in every conceivable case . . . .” See id. at 67.
29. See, e.g., POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 21, at 11.
30. Most obligations do not require an authoritative determination; however, a third party
obligation to intervene deviates from bilateralism, differentiating it from most obligations. See Int’l L.
Ass’n, Sofia Conference: Recognition and Non-Recognition in International Law (2012).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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The Report stipulates that, “[n]o State shall recognize as lawful a
situation created by a serious breach.”33 The Report does not inform States
who determines when a violation counts as a serious breach.34 The Report’s
commentary discussion of countermeasures and invocations of
responsibility by non-injured States also fails to inform on this issue.35 The
Report’s commentary does provide examples of non-recognition, all of
which involve a determination by the Security Council or the ICJ.36
However, it would be a mistake to derive rules by inference from a list of
examples. Thus, States are left wondering whether an obligation not to
recognize arises once a relevant violation is identified or whether it requires
a determination of illegality by an impartial authoritative body.37
Furthermore, even assuming the requirements of non-recognition are not
automatic, the ILC Report still does not inform States when the obligation
may be invoked by a State to justify its own actions.38
Subsequently, scholars have tried to clarify the content of the
obligation, but have come short to differing degrees. Alison Pert submits
that, in any given situation, the details of what the obligation practically
entails can be determined only with a specific resolution.39 Martin
Dawidowicz found that tribunals and political organs of the United Nations
have been reluctant to provide general rules of content.40 Similarly, Eugene
Kontorovich argued that the ICJ, in discussing the principle of nonrecognition, relies heavily on case-sensitive Security Council resolutions.41
However, the Article demonstrates that past ICJ decisions go beyond
concrete cases to provide three negative requirements that follow from an
obligation of non-recognition, and consciously choose to provide only
minimum requirements because of the nature of the obligation.42 While a
few scholars have correctly identified some of the content of the negative
obligation as argued in Part II, they incorrectly object to the inclusion of
other requirements discussed in this Article.43
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Report, supra note 19, at 53-54 (alteration in original).
See id. at 53.
See id. at 286-87.
Id. at 288-89.
See id. at 286-87.
See Report, supra note 19, at 286-87.
Pert, supra note 14, at 22.
Martin Dawidowicz, The Obligation of Non-recognition of an Unlawful Situation, in THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 677, 686 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter
Dawidowicz].
41. Eugene Kontorovich, Economic Dealings with Occupied Territories, 53 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L. L. 584, 589-90 (2015).
42. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion,
1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, 55-58, ¶¶ 121-33 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia Case].
43. See, e.g., Talmon, supra note 14, at 105-06; see also infra Part II.
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With regard to when the obligation arises, many scholars have
identified when the obligation applies, but have failed to acknowledge that
their conclusion amounts to a conceptual revolution made legally defensible
by recent events.44 As early as Hersch Lauterpacht, scholars have argued
that deductive reasoning mandates that all States comply with the principle
of non-recognition—even absent an authoritative determination.45. Through
step-by-step analysis, this Article shows that not logical reasoning, but
ethical wishes ground this defense of a self-executing principle.46 Other
scholars47 seem to rely in part on Judge Skubiszewski who, in the East
Timor48 case, posited that the principle “is self-executory.”49 While these
scholars correctly recognize that the ICJ implicitly adopts this view, they
miss the fact that this implicit self-executing understanding did not occur
until the highly controversial ICJ advisory opinion Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in The Occupied Palestinian Territory (“Wall
Case”).50
To bring clarity to the principle, this Article divides the modern
development of the principle of non-recognition into two time periods—pre
and post-Wall Case. Part II analyzes ICJ cases, States’ votes in the United
Nations, and scholarly arguments pre-Wall Case to develop a clear
understanding of the past application of the principle.51 Part III introduces
the ICJ’s recent decision in the Wall Case and highlights its radical holding
that the obligation of non-recognition applies to all States even absent an
authoritative determination.52 Finally, Part IV moves beyond strict legal
analysis to suggest how the international community should respond to the
change in the principle.53
II.

PRE-WALL
A. Instituting an Obligation

With regard to who may institute a requirement of non-recognition prior
to the Wall Case, Court decisions and State opinion made clear that a
binding determination by a competent organ of the United Nations created
44. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 14, at 16.
45. H. LAUTERPACHT, The Problem of Non-Recognition: The Principle of Non-recognition in
International Law, in INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EASTERN
CONFLICT 129-30, 139-40 (1941) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, Problem].
46. See infra Part II.A.3.
47. See, e.g., Dawidowicz, supra note 40, at 683.
48. Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 90 (June 30).
49. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 262-63, ¶ 125 (June 30) (dissenting opinion by Skubiszewski, J.).
50. See 2004 I.C.J. at 136, 138, 199, ¶¶ 155, 157.
51. See infra Part II.
52. See infra Part III.
53. See infra Part IV.
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an obligation of non-recognition.54 State opinion further clarified that States
believed they could justify their own actions based on the principle of nonrecognition, and the principle of non-recognition only applied when a
serious breach of international law occurred.55 While scholars advanced
deductive arguments for accepting a constitutive principle of nonrecognition, these deductive arguments received little attention from either
the States or the ICJ and ultimately failed to establish a self-executing
alternative to the declarative norm.56
1. The Security Council and the ICJ
There is strong support for the conclusion that prior to the Wall Case
“[a] binding determination made by a competent organ of the United
Nations to the effect that a situation is illegal”57 may create an obligation of
non-recognition.58 In particular, decisions of the ICJ recognized Security
Council authority to do so and implied that the Court may likewise impose
the obligation under appropriate circumstances.59
In the Namibia Case,60 referring to Security Council 276 (1970) and
other resolutions, the Court declared that “[a] binding determination made
by a competent organ of the United Nations . . . cannot remain without
consequence.”61 As a result, the ICJ then turned “to the legal consequences
arising for States from the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia . .
. .”62 The ICJ held States “are under [an] obligation to recognize the
illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia . . . .”63
54. See, e.g., Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 54, ¶ 117.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Talmon, supra note 14, at 121-22.
57. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 54, ¶ 117 (alteration in original).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (alteration in original).
62. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 54, ¶ 117. To explain how Resolution 276 (1970) and other
resolutions, which were not decisions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, could create a binding
determination that South Africa’s actions were illegal, the Court turned to Articles 24 and 25 of the
Charter. Id. at 51-54, ¶¶ 109-16 (noting that Article 24(2)’s reference to specific powers of the Security
Council under certain chapters of the Charter did not preclude the existence of a general power to
discharge the responsibility of maintaining peace and security conferred in Article 24(1)). Therefore,
since the determination that South Africa’s actions were illegal in relation to the maintenance of peace
and security, Article 24(1) provided the legal basis for the Resolution. Id. at 51-52, ¶¶ 109-10. Having
identified the legal basis for the Security Council’s actions, the Court reasoned it would be “an untenable
interpretation to maintain that [States] would be free to act in disregard of [the finding] . . . .” Id. at 52, ¶
112 (alteration in original). This led the Court to conclude that the Security Council’s determination
gained binding status under Article 25. Id. at 52-53, ¶¶ 112-14. The Court concluded that “[a] binding
determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations . . . cannot remain without
consequence” and turn to “the legal consequences arising for States from the continued presence of
South Africa in Namibia.” Id. at 54, ¶ 117 (alteration in original).
63. Id. at 133.
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Similarly, in the Case Concerning East Timor, the Court’s decision
suggests that the Security Council may declare an obligation of nonrecognition and that the Court may review a Security Council resolution to
determine if the resolution instituted an obligation of non-recognition.64
After Indonesia took de facto control of East Timor, Australia entered into a
contract with Indonesia regarding East Timor on December 11, 1989.65 On
February 22, 1991, Portugal sued Australia for failing to observe: (1) the
obligation to respect Portugal as the administering power; and (2) the right
of the people of East Timor to self-determination.66 The Court began its
decision by noting that all parties agreed that the ICJ could not entertain the
case if a ruling required the Court to determine the rights and obligations of
a third party that had not granted jurisdiction to the Court.67 Since the
legality of Australia’s action required a ruling on the legality of Indonesia’s
actions, a matter beyond the Court’s jurisdiction in Indonesia’s absence, the
Court largely avoided the principle of non-recognition.68 However, from the
Court’s decision it appears the ICJ assumes that the United Nations could
have issued a resolution prohibiting recognition.69
Furthermore, if only a jurisdictional issue prevented the ICJ from
finding an obligation, in principle the ICJ could find an obligation.70 The
Court made it clear in the Case Concerning East Timor that it could not rule
on the lawfulness of a third State’s conduct in the absence of that State’s
64. See East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 273, ¶ 156.
65. Id. at 98, ¶ 18.
66. Id. at 92, ¶ 1.
67. Id. at 101, ¶ 26.
68. Id. at 104-05, ¶ 34. One notable exception is Judge Skubiszewski’s dissenting opinion. He
wrote, “the obligation not to recognize a situation created by the unlawful use of force does not arise
only as a result of a decision by the Security Council ordering non-recognition. The rule is selfexecutory.” Id. at 263, ¶ 125 (dissenting opinion by Skubiszewski, J.).
69. See East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 103-04, ¶¶ 31-32. It is a mistake to conclude from this case
that the ICJ must pass judgment on the obligation for there to be a binding obligation of non-recognition.
It is also a mistake to conclude that non-recognition imposable against third party States in judicial
proceedings cannot emanate from the U.N. political organs alone. But see Thomas D. Grant, East
Timor, the U.N. System, and Enforcing Non-Recognition in International Law, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 273, 309 (2000). As for the first erroneous conclusion, although the ICJ did review the resolutions to
determine whether it created an obligation of non-recognition, this was because the resolutions were
evidence in a judicial proceeding, not because the resolutions could not have had a binding effect prior to
a Court reviewing them. See East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 103-04, ¶¶ 31-32. Similar reasoning explains
why the second conclusion is also incorrect. See id. When the ICJ reviewed the resolutions, it was
examining if, as Portugal claimed, the Security Council passed resolutions that were imposable against
third party States. See id. The Court determined that the resolutions did not clearly mandate an
obligation of non-recognition. See id. This finding, and not concerns that mere literal interpretation of
the resolution would violate the third party principal, prevented the Court from concluding there was no
obligation of non-recognition. Id. at 119 (separate opinion by Shahabudden, J.) (arguing that
interpreting the resolutions as required to determine an obligation of non-recognition would violate the
third party principle).
70. See East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 104-05, ¶ 34.
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consent.71 Therefore, without the relevant act already being determined as
illegal by the Security Council or the violating State participating in the
case, the Court cannot find an obligation of non-recognition.72 However, if
the jurisdictional issues were removed, the ICJ could, on its own, hold that
the obligation of non-recognition existed.73
2. States’ Views of the Obligation of Non-recognition74
The ICJ cases hold that a binding determination made by a competent
organ may lead to an obligation of non-recognition; however, the Court is
silent on whether the Security Council’s resolution is necessary for nonrecognition to be obligatory.75 Nevertheless, States believe they can justify
their own actions based on the principle of non-recognition. 76
i. States’ Votes in the U.N.
On November 11, 1965, the white minority government of Rhodesia
unilaterally declared independence from the United Kingdom.77 The
Security Council condemned the unilateral declaration, calling upon States

71. Id. at 101, ¶ 26 (“The Court recalls in this respect that one of the fundamental principles of its
Statute is that it cannot decide a dispute between States without the consent of those States to its
jurisdiction.”).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 104-05, ¶ 34.
74. Most scholars and the ICJ understand the ICJ Statute description of custom as “evidence of a
general practice accepted as law” to posit two necessary elements for custom: (1) general practice; and
(2) opinio juris. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 44, ¶ 77
(Feb. 20); Int’l L. Ass’n, London Conference, Committee on Formation of Customary (General)
International Law, 6-7, ¶¶ 9-10 (2000). With two elements required for the formation of customary
international law, the ICJ in subsequent cases developed and applied two approaches to such law. Under
the traditional approach, State practice in the form of physical actions provides the primary consideration
in determining customary international law. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 757-58 (2001).
The role of opinio juris, the belief that that there is a legal obligation, only distinguishes between legal
obligations and practices not occurring pursuant to legal obligations. See id. In contrast, the modern
approach, opinio juris in the forms of statements and declarations, is primary. See id. Since the modern
approach relies on statements rather than actions in determining custom, traditional evidence of State
practice plays a secondary role, if a role at all. See id.; see also Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor
Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEX. INT’L L. J. 87, 97-99 (1991). The
Article does not take sides in the debate between traditional and modern approaches to customary law,
but instead allows the reader to decide which view is preferable. See generally id.
75. Individual judges argue over whether the principle is self-executing, but the Court does not
discuss whether the obligation can be self-executing. Compare East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 262-23, ¶ 125
(dissenting opinion by Skubiszewski, J.), with Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 168 (separate opinion by
Dillard, J.).
76. See generally East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. 90 (the examination of State views is not supposed to
represent an authoritative study on State practice of non-recognition).
77. G.A. Res. 20/2022 (XX), Question of Southern Rhodesia, at 54 (Nov. 5, 1965).
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not to recognize Rhodesia or provide assistance to the illegal regime.78
Subsequently, the General Assembly passed a resolution that condemned:
activities of those foreign financial and other interests which, by
supporting and assisting the illegal racist minority regime in
Southern Rhodesia, are preventing the African people of Zimbabwe
from attaining freedom and independence . . . and calls upon
Governments of the States concerned to take all necessary measures
to bring to an end such activities . . . .79
Rhodesia is not an isolated case of the General Assembly encouraging
States not to recognize an illegal act prior to a binding determination of an
obligation of non-recognition.80
Like the Security Council, the General Assembly has adopted nonbinding resolutions calling on States not to recognize the creation of illegal
States. For example, in 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus and a Turkish
Federated State of Cyprus was established in the part of the island
controlled by Turkey.81 In 1983, the Assembly of the Turkish Federated
State of Cyprus declared the establishment of a new State, the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus.82 Responding to this new situation, the
Security Council adopted a non-binding resolution that called upon “all
States not to recognize any Cyproit State other than the Republic of
Cyprus”83 and another non-binding resolution that condemned Turkey’s
exchange of ambassadors with the new State and again called on all States
not to recognize the purported State.84
ii. Analyzing How States Vote
States’ voting practices strongly suggest that States believe they can
justify their own actions based on the principle of non-recognition prior to a
binding determination.85 The resolutions examined above encourage States
not to recognize particular acts even prior to a binding resolution.86 This
means that if States could fulfill the requirements of non-recognition prior

78. S.C. Res. 216, ¶¶ 1-2 (Nov. 12, 1965).
79. G.A. Res. 21/2151 (XXI), Question of Southern Rhodesia, ¶ 5 (Nov. 17, 1966) (alteration in
original).
80. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 30/3411 (XXX), Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South
Africa, ¶¶ 8-13 (Dec. 10, 1975).
81. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 541, at 15 (Nov. 18, 1983).
82. Id.
83. S.C. Res. 541, ¶ 7 (Nov. 18, 1983).
84. S.C. Res. 550, ¶ 3 (May 11, 1984).
85. See Talmon, supra note 14, at 121.
86. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 550, supra note 82, ¶ 3; G.A. Res. 541, supra note 81, ¶ 7.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU,

11

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 43 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1

12

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

to a binding determination, they should do so.87 It would make little sense
for the members of the General Assembly or the Security Council to
encourage such behavior without believing it to be legal.88 Thus, States
appear at a minimum to adopt the moderate approach; this approach allows
individual States to justify their own actions based upon the principal, but
maintains, absent an authoritative legal and factual determination, the
invocation that does not impact third parties.89
Some may wish to infer more from States’ voting practices and
conclude States view non-recognition as a constitutive obligation.90 Under
this reasoning, States called on each other and condemned individual States
that recognized illegal acts.91 They did so prior to an authoritative
determination of non-recognition while armed only with votes that resulted
in non-binding resolutions calling for non-recognition.92 States, so the
reasoning goes, not only believe that they can justify their own actions, as
well as call on others not to recognize, but they also believe that they can
bind others not to recognize as well.93
This conclusion goes too far. In voting for these resolutions, States
express their belief that they may invoke the principle of non-recognition to
justify their own actions, while also indicating that they believe they can
signal their desire that other States not recognize the illegal act.94 However,
to conclude from States calling on other States to behave a certain way that
States believe they can bind other States to behave that way is a stretch.95
The act of calling on States may be expressing a normative call without also
expressing a legal claim that States, absent an authoritative determination,
have an obligation not to recognize.96 With voting practice consistent with
the moderate approach and without strong reason to take the further
constitutive step, voting practice supports a moderate principle.97
This reasoning is bolstered by the European Court of Justice’s
determination that Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), which called on
States not to recognize the Turkish Republic of Cyprus but was not passed
87. See Talmon, supra note 14, at 121.
88. See id. at 121-22.
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., id. at 121-22 (“Many, if not most, of the calls for non-recognition have been made
in non-binding resolutions of the General Assembly and in statements of the President of the Security
Council, which could neither authoritatively determine the existence of a serious breach nor create an
obligation not to recognize a situation as lawful[,]” but Talmon concludes this is not a prerequisite for
the obligation of non-recognition to arise.) (alteration in original).
91. See id. at 122-23.
92. See Talmon, supra note 14, at 122-23.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 122.
97. See Talmon, supra note 14, at 122.
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under Article VII, is nonbinding in nature.98 Thus, the nonbinding
resolutions do not demonstrate that States view the obligation of nonrecognition as applying independently of an authoritative determination.99
3. An Obligation Absent an Authoritative Determination: Failed
Philosophical Defenses
With analysis of ICJ decisions providing no clear support for a
constitutive theory of the principle of non-recognition and States’ votes only
definitively revealing, States may rely on the principle absent an
authoritative declaration.100 Deductive reasoning is the last resort of
proponents of a constitutive approach, and deductive arguments have
received little attention from States or the ICJ in recent years. Thus, this
section only analyzes and demonstrates the ultimate failure of one of the
early and more famous advocates of deductive arguments, as well as what
appears to be the current dominant logical reason for why, absent an
authoritative determination, an obligation exists for all States not to
recognize certain illegal acts.
With his unique style of progressive interpretation, Hersch Lauterpacht,
former member of the United Nations’ International Law Commission and
ICJ judge,101 offers a deductive defense of a constitutive obligation of nonrecognition.102 First, Lauterpacht introduces the fundamental principle of
international law that an illegal act cannot lead to a legal right for the
wrongdoer (ex injuria jus non oritur).103 Defending this premise,
Lauterpacht does not deny the contrary principle that law arises from fact
(ex factis jus oritur).104 Nevertheless, Lauterpacht points out that just as the
laws of grammar are not wholly dependent on our compliance with them,
98. Case 204/86, Greek Republic v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 5337, 5353, ¶ 13. In this case, Greece
first argued that the Security Council resolution called “upon all States not to recognize any Cypriot
State other than the Republic of Cyprus.” Id. at 5339, ¶ 3. It then reasoned that since the Turkish
Government recognized the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, the European Community “cannot grant
it the special aid without ignoring that breach and thereby itself violating an obligation imposed on it
under a measure which is binding on it by virtue of the principle of substitution.” Id. at 5352, ¶ 13.
While there appear to be many problems with Greece’s argument, the ECJ rejected Greece’s argument
because the resolution was not binding. Id. at 5353, ¶ 13 (“It is manifest from the wording of the
operative part and from the debates and the declarations of vote prior to the adoption of Resolution No[.]
541 that the resolution does not constitute a ‘decision’ and is therefore not a binding measure, but a
measure in the nature of a mere recommendation.”).
99. See, e.g., id. at 5353, ¶ 13.
100. See Talmon, supra note 14, at 122-23.
101. This style of interpretation of international law is guided by the proposition that
“international law should be functionally oriented towards both the establishment of peace between
nations and the protection of fundamental human rights.” Patrick Capps, Lauterpacht’s Method, 82
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 248, 249 (2012).
102. See LAUTERPACHT, Problem, supra note 45, at 133.
103. Id. at 133, 139.
104. Id. at 142-43.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU,

13

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 43 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1

14

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

the validity of the laws of recognition are not dependent upon compliance in
any individual case.105 Second, Lauterpacht posits that without an
international court endowed with obligatory jurisdiction to decide questions
of recognition, States must act as judges.106 From these two arguments,
Lauterpacht seems to logically derive his self-standing obligation of nonrecognition.107
However, Lauterpacht fails to provide a successful deductive argument
for a self-standing obligation of non-recognition.108 There are multiple
ways to interpret the concept ex injuria jus non oritur; thus, it alone cannot
justify the obligation of non-recognition. For example, applying the
concept to non-recognition, it may only posit that illegal actions cannot be
the source of a demand for recognition, but that States still remain free to
confer recognition if they wish.109 Thus, under this interpretation of the
principle ex injuria jus non oritur, non-recognition would be consistent with
the moderate and declarative approaches.110
Lauterpacht’s second claim tries and fails to answer this challenge.
Building on the proposition that States must act as judges in the absence of
courts, it might be reasoned that since the international legal system does
not yet have such judges, States must fully adopt the behavior of impartial
judges when recognizing entities.111 As impartial judges, States cannot, as
proposed above, acknowledge a legal principle that prevents them from
being required to recognize an entity but nevertheless recognize the entity
for political reasons.112
Lauterpacht’s second claim is grounded not in logical reasons, but in
ethical wishes. In the absence of courts, Lauterpacht correctly observes that
States must be allowed to issue judgments on the recognition of statehood,
because to deny them this power would “result in an absurdity consisting in
the duty of States to refrain from questioning the legality of actions of other
States in any circumstances . . . .”113 However, this reasoning only explains
105. Id. at 143.
106. Id. at 133.
107. See LAUTERPACHT, Problem, supra note 45, at 133. Lauterpacht was widely criticized for his
broader theory of recognition and specifically for his arguments about non-recognition. For example,
Josef L. Kunz, one of Lauterpacht’s harshest critics, wrote that in his primary endeavors “it must be said
in the interest of scientific truth, [Lauterpacht] has failed completely.” Josef L. Kunz, Critical Remarks
on Lauterpacht’s ‘Recognition in International Law’, 44 AM. J. INT’L L. 713, 714, 717-18 (1950)
(alteration in original) (arguing that Lauterpacht failed because he did not support his theory with
accurate examples of State practice). This Note’s critique shows that Lauterpacht’s argument fails
logically as well.
108. See LAUTERPACHT, Problem, supra note 45, at 133.
109. See id. at 140.
110. See Talmon, supra note 14, at 122-23.
111. See LAUTERPACHT, Problem, supra note 45, at 133.
112. See id. at 133-34.
113. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION, supra note 8, at 413.
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why States must be able to not recognize prospective States; it says nothing
about a State being obligated not to enter into an agreement with an entity
that may have performed an illegal act.114
In contrast to Lauterpacht, today many scholars and the ILC associate
the principle of non-recognition with a peremptory norm. For example,
with regard to the obligation of non-recognition, the ILC states, “[t]his
chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a
serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm
of general international law.”115 Many who associate the principle with a
peremptory norm simply assume that this implies that the binding nature of
the principle does not depend upon an authoritative determination.116 For
example, after identifying non-recognition as grounded in peremptory
norms, Dawidowicz writes, “[t]herefore, individual States are obligated . . .
not to recognize certain unlawful situations; they do not require the approval
of UN organs to justify their actions since this obligation is selfexecutory.”117 However, like Lauterpacht’s argument, this line of reasoning
fails.118
First, identifying the obligation of non-recognition with peremptory
norms by the ILC and others is a mistake.119 The ILC cites to the Namibia
Case as authority, but the Namibia Case does not tie the obligation of nonrecognition to a peremptory norm.120 In the Case Concerning East Timor,
Judge Skubiszewski narrowly predicted that the obligation of nonrecognition of forcible acquisition of territory might develop into a
peremptory norm.121 However, in the Wall Case—the most recent ICJ case
addressing the obligation of non-recognition—the majority, when
discussing the obligation of non-recognition, focused not on peremptory

114. See id.
115. Report, supra note 19, at 112 (alteration in original).
116. See, e.g., Dawidowicz, supra note 40, at 683. In fact, a version of this assumption
substituting peremptory with the concept of erga omnes seems to motivate the Court in the Wall Case
discussed below. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 196, ¶ 155. However, like the peremptory argument, the
Court’s reasoning in the Wall Case is flawed: an erga omnes obligation solely means it is an obligation
owed to the community as a whole; however, the Wall Case states nothing about whether the obligation
applies independently from an authoritative determination or if any State may invoke the obligation to
justify its own behavior. See Crawford, supra note 14, at 16, ¶ 41 (agreeing with erga omnes obligations
in part and noting, “Law does not compel those concerned to seek a remedy, even if they are entitled to
do so.”).
117. Dawidowicz, supra note 40, at 683 (alteration in original).
118. See Kunz, supra note 107, at 718.
119. See Report, supra note 19, at 115.
120. See id.
121. See East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 262-63, ¶ 125 (“The rule may be said to be at present in the
course of possibly reaching a stage when it would share in the nature of the principle of which it is a
corollary, i.e., the principle of the non-use of force. In that hypothesis non-recognition would acquire
the rank of a peremptory norm of that law . . . .”).
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norms, but on erga omnes obligations—obligations whose performance all
States seem to have a legal interest in.122
Second, even if the obligation of non-recognition has a peremptory
character, this does not shed light on whether the principle creates an
obligation absent a binding determination.123 A peremptory norm is an
obligation owed by States to the community of States as a whole and from
which no derogation is permitted.124 It is not a norm that, by definition, is
self-realizing.125 In other words, even if the principle of non-recognition
comes about after such a violation—and a State cannot choose to ignore the
principle of non-recognition—the peremptory status of the obligation says
nothing about who declares that the obligation applies to a specific
situation.126
4. Marshalling the Principle; A Limitation
Votes in the United Nations and ICJ cases suggest a limitation on what
may be cited as a reason for instituting an obligation of non-recognition and
how States may explain a choice of non-recognition.127 In justifying its
findings, the ICJ focused on illegal territorial acquisitions and systematic
racial discrimination.128 The United Nations, in its resolutions, focused on
similar principles.129 This suggests that maximally the principle may be
instituted when a serious breach of an erga omnes norm occurs.130 More
conservatively, this practice can be interpreted as allowing the institution of
an obligation of non-recognition only if one of the peremptory norms
referred to by the Security Council or the ICJ are violated.131 An important
implication of such recognition is that under the ICJ rulings and State
practice, not all violations of international law may lead to an obligation of

122. Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 199, ¶¶ 154-56.
123. See Report, supra note 19, at 112.
124. See id. at 56.
125. See id.
126. See id. This error in logical reasoning might explain why many academics have not
acknowledged, as discussed below, the Wall Case’s radical declaration that the principle is binding
absent an authoritative declaration. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 196, ¶ 146. For these academics, the
Wall Case’s declaration merely expressed an implication of the principle that the ICJ did not yet
recognize (or at least formally acknowledge). See id.
127. Report, supra note 19, at 114 (“The existence of an obligation of non-recognition in response
to serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms already finds support in international
practice and in decisions of ICJ.”).
128. See, e.g., Dawidowicz, supra note 40, at 685-86; Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 171-72, ¶¶ 87-88;
Report, supra note 19, at 127.
129. See Report, supra note 19, at 85.
130. See id. at 112 (ILC stipulates that an obligation may be instituted when a serious breach of a
peremptory norm occurs).
131. See Report, supra note 19, at 56; see also Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 171-72, ¶¶ 87-88.
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non-recognition.132 This might explain, in part, why despite the fact that
Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s nationalization of Nelson Hunts’ oil
operations was framed by international legal scholars as a violation of
international law and should have been met with non-recognition,133 no such
action was taken.134
5. An Example: Pre-Wall Case—The Obligation Arising
The previously discussed ICJ cases and State voting in the United
Nations provide two answers to the question of when an obligation of nonrecognition arises. First, the analysis demonstrates that the obligation of
non-recognition applies after an authoritative determination and may be
instituted only when a particular type of breach of international law
occurs.135 Second, States’ votes in the United Nations suggest many States
believe they may determine at their own risk that the requirements of the
principle of non-recognition should be fulfilled.136
These rules provide considerable guidance to States. Imagine a State
called Aggressor illegally invades a State called Innocence and begins to
build settlements in the occupied territory. Some of the most powerful
States condemn Aggressor’s action, but because of gridlock, no competent
organ of the United Nations issues a determination condemning the act.
Given the analysis above, it is clear what a third State, called Observer,
must do to determine if it has an obligation of non-recognition.
At the outset, Observer must determine if there is a binding
determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations that creates
an obligation of non-recognition. As presupposed, no competent organ of
the United Nations issues a determination condemning the act. Therefore,
Observer could easily conclude there is no binding obligation. Prior to the
Wall Case, this would have ended Observer’s analysis of whether there was
a binding obligation of non-recognition.
B. Content of the Obligation of Non-recognition
Prior to the Wall Case, international law acknowledged three minimum
negative requirements and a limiting condition following from the
132. See Dawidowicz, supra note 40, at 686.
133. F.S.R., Nationalization and International Law: Testimony of Elihu Lauterpacht, Q.C., 17
INT’L L. 97, 109 (1983).
134. Instead, Hunt was left “publishing notices in newspapers throughout the world claiming that
the Libyan nationalization violated international law and threatening to sue anyone who bought [his] oil
from Libya.” Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322, 323 (Tex. 1979) (alteration in
original).
135. See Dawidowicz, supra note 40, at 684.
136. See id. at 683.
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obligation of non-recognition.137 The Pre-Wall cases set only a minimum,
because the nature of the obligation prevents codification of an extensive
general list of requirements that follow from the obligation.138 Still, by
establishing three negative requirements, it could no longer be claimed that
the obligation of non-recognition is satisfied by a mere formal
declaration.139
1. Three Negative Requirements
A minimum of three negative requirements following from the
obligation demonstrate that the obligation of non-recognition is not only a
formality.140 In 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted
Resolution 2145 (XXI), in which it terminated South Africa’s mandate over
Namibia.141 The General Assembly, however, lacked the necessary powers
to ensure the withdrawal of South Africa and therefore requested the
assistance of the Security Council.142 The Security Council responded with
Resolution 276 (1970) and other resolutions declaring South Africa’s failure
to withdraw illegal.143
On July 29, 1970, the ICJ was asked: “what are the legal consequences
for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia,
137. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55, ¶¶ 121-23.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that
“[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.” G.A.
Res. 25/2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration on Principles of International Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, at 123 (Oct. 24,
1970) (alteration in original). In drafting the Declaration and debating its meaning, many States opposed
this wording, arguing that the phrase “as legal” allowed for unqualified non-recognition. Talmon, supra
note 14, at 109 (citing U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., 81st-96th mtgs. at 43, Doc. A/AC.125/SR.81-96 (Oct.
21, 1968) (providing Mexico’s concerns with including the modifying phrase). The States that opposed
including the phrase “as legal” feared that such language would allow States to simply deny de jure
recognition to the entity in question while continuing to deal with it. See Talmon, supra note 14, at 109,
111-12. States like Australia and England strongly supported such interpretation and made no secret of
their belief that it was not functionally feasible to require a broad understanding of the obligation of nonrecognition. U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 26th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/SR.26, at 12-13 (July 25, 1966);
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 25th mtg. at 16-17, U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/SR.25 (July 25, 1966); see Talmon,
supra note 14, at 108 & n.40, 111-12. Though the Court did not abandon the “as legal” qualification or
comment on de jure recognition, the Court’s decisions, with their support of three requirements, provide
an inclusive understanding of what would qualify “as legal recognition.” See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J.
at 55, ¶¶ 121-23. In doing so, the Court rejects the proposal that the obligation of non-recognition may
be satisfied solely by a formal declaration and resolves the disagreement surrounding the Declaration on
Principles of International Law by effectively siding with those States that opposed Australia and
England. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55, ¶¶ 121-23; U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 25th mtg. at 16-17,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/SR.25 (July 25, 1966).
141. See G.A. Res. 2145 (XXI), at 2 (Oct. 27, 1966).
142. See Talmon, supra note 14, at 113.
143. See id.; see also S.C. Res. 276, ¶ 2 (Jan. 30, 1970).
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notwithstanding Security Council [R]esolution 276 (1970)?”144 The Court
began its answer by noting that “[t]he precise determination of the acts
permitted or allowed . . . .” is a matter for the Security Council.145 Still, the
Court pressed on, revealing its intent to provide generally applicable
requirements by stating that it would:
confine itself to giving advice on those dealings with the
Government of South Africa which, under the Charter of the United
Nations and general international law, should be considered as
inconsistent with the declaration of illegality and invalidity made in
paragraph 2 of [R]esolution 276 (1970), because they may imply a
recognition that South Africa’s presence in Namibia is legal.146
The Court then noted three requirements that follow from an obligation
of non-recognition.147 First, the Court called on States to abstain from
entering, invoking, or applying treaties where the government of South

144. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 58, ¶ 133.
145. Id. at 55, ¶ 120 (alteration in original).
146. Id. at 55, ¶ 121.
147. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55, ¶¶ 121-23. The clarity provided by the Namibia Court’s
list of requirements should not be overstated. In subparagraph 2 of the operative clause, the Court held
that U.N. member States:
are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia and the
invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in
particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the
legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration.
Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 58, ¶ 133. The ICJ added, “[I]t is incumbent upon States which are not
Members of the United Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the
action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia.” See id. (alteration in
original). One can read subparagraph (2) of the operative clause as deviating from the Court’s list of
three obligations. See id. However, this broad language should be read in the context of the extensive
discussion of the decision as providing three minimal requirements, and also as leaving the door open to
further Security Council action. The Court did not specify if these requirements were the only
implications, which allowed the Judges to provide conflicting accounts of the extent of a third party’s
obligations in their separate opinions. See id. at 55, ¶¶ 121-23. For example, in his separate opinion,
Judge Ammoun proceeds to “supplement the Opinion” with more restrictions. Id. at 97, ¶ 16 (separate
opinion by Ammoun, J.). Judge Ammoun explains that the Court erred to think a more detailed list
would lead to confusion, and thus derives the principle of neutrality from the Security Council
resolution. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 97, ¶ 16 (separate opinion by Ammoun, J.). He further derives
obligations from the principle of non-recognition, such as, “States should debar themselves and should
forbid their nationals, subjects and foreign residents, under penalties, from having any part in South
African companies or undertakings registered or established in Namibian territory.” Id. (separate
opinion by Ammoun, J.). In contrast, given the possible disconnect between subparagraph (2) of the
operative clause and the reasoning that led up to it, as well as Judge Ammoun’s even more radical
interpretation of the obligation of non-recognition, Judge de Castro and Judge Dillard only conditionally
supported the Court’s opinion. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 165-67 (separate opinion by Dillard,
J.); Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 217 (separate opinion by de Castro, J.).
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Africa purports to act on behalf of Namibia.148 Second, the Court required
States to refrain from diplomatic relations that imply recognition of South
Africa’s authority over Namibia.149 Third, the Court directed States to
abstain from entering into economic or other forms of relations that might
entrench South Africa’s control over Namibia.150 Thus, for the Court, three
requirements of the principle of non-recognition derive from the United
Nations’ Charter and general international law.151
Stefan Talmon objected to the inclusion of the requirement of not
providing aid as part of the obligation of non-recognition.152 Talmon
conceded that not providing aid to maintaining an illegal act “may be seen
as a logical extension of the duty of non-recognition,” but warned that,
because not all aid suggests recognition, the “obligation not to recognize as
lawful a certain situation must be distinguished from the obligation not to
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”153 Talmon claimed
both the Court and the ILC share his view.154 While Talmon is correct that
the ILC shares his reasoning, he is wrong to conclude the Court agrees with
his conclusion.155 Specifically addressing conduct that entrenches an illegal
act, the Court in the Namibia Case wrote:
The restraints which are implicit in the non-recognition of South
Africa’s presence in Namibia . . . impose upon member States the
obligation to abstain from entering into economic and other forms
of relationship or dealings with South Africa on behalf of or
concerning Namibia which may entrench its authority over the
Territory.156

148. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55, ¶ 122
149. Id. at 55, ¶ 123.
150. Id. at 55-56, ¶ 124.
151. See id. at 55, ¶ 120. But see Kontorovich, supra note 41, at 589 (citing S.C. Res. 276, supra
note 143, at ¶ 5) (arguing that in Namibia the ICJ derived the content of the duty of non-recognition “as
much from the principle of non-recognition as from the express language of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 276.”). However, Kontorovich identifies the resolution as “unusually broad” because the
resolution stated that the “very ‘presence’ of South Africa” was “‘illegal and invalid’” and therefore
declared all acts performed by South Africa in Namibia to be illegal and invalid. See Kontorovich,
supra note 41, at 589-90. Yet, the Court’s distinguishing between some acts that could not be
recognized from other recognizable acts, such as registration of births, deaths, and marriages,
undermines this claim. S.C. Res. 276, supra note 143, at ¶ 2; see Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 56, ¶ 125.
152. Talmon, supra note 14, at 105-06.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Report, supra note 19, at 115 (“In some respects, the prohibition contained in paragraph 2
may be seen as a logical extension of the duty of non-recognition. However, it has a separate scope of
application insofar as actions are concerned which would not imply recognition of the situation created
by serious breaches in the sense of article 40.”).
156. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55, ¶ 124.
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Thus, for the Court, the requirement prohibiting aid is derived from the
obligation of non-recognition and extends to all acts that entrench the
authority of the illegal act.157
2. Meaningful Requirements Without Rigidity
What will be interpreted as an act of recognition depends on the
situation. In one situation, diplomatic relations may reflect recognition and,
in another situation, the same diplomatic relations may reflect the need to
save one’s citizens.158 Similarly, what assists in maintaining the situation
depends on the situation.159
Acknowledging this need for flexible, meaningful requirements in the
Namibia Case, the Court noted:
[t]he precise determination of the acts permitted or allowed—what
measures are available and practicable, which of them should be
selected, what scope they should be given and by whom they should
be applied—is a matter which lies within the competence of the
appropriate political organs of the United Nations . . . .160
Thus, though the lack of a fixed list of obligations often reflects confusion,
in this case it results from a conscious decision.161
That the absence of a detailed list of requirements reflects a conscious
choice is further supported by Judge Dillard, who explains:
[a] detailed specification of the particular acts which may or may
not be compatible with South Africa’s illegal presence in Namibia
cannot be determined in advance since they depend on numerous
factors including not only the interests of contracting parties who
acted in good faith but the immediate and future welfare of the
inhabitants of Namibia.162
Not only do the requirements that follow from an obligation of nonrecognition depend on what would be interpreted as an act of recognition,
they also depend upon what constitutes support of the illegal act.163 This
determination turns upon ascertaining the types of actions parties entered
into and the needs of the violated entity.164 For Judge Dillard, building a
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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road in occupied territories may constitute support in one situation, but the
need to end a humanitarian crisis in another.165 The Namibia Case thus
provides a meaningful yet flexible response to illegal State action.166
3. Humanitarian Exception/Reminder
After discussing the three minimum negative requirements, the Court
includes a clarifying provision noting, “[i]n general, the non-recognition of
South Africa’s administration of the Territory should not result in depriving
the people of Namibia of any advantages derived from international
cooperation.”167 Since the clarification is linked to the three general
requirements, the Court implied that it should be applied beyond the
Namibia Case.168 Furthermore, none of the ICJ’s other non-recognition
cases challenge this proposition.169 Thus, there is no reason to believe the
clarification does not extend to all cases of non-recognition.170
While academic hermeneutics have complicated the meaning of this
clarifying rule,171 a literal reading of the rule provides clear legal, if
factually-dependent, guidance. The rule reads:
In general, the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of
the Territory should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of
any advantages derived from international co-operation.
In
particular, while official acts performed by the Government of
South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the
termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity
cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the
registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can
be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the
Territory.172
The first sentence of the excerpt explains that the clarifying rule frees States
from the three requirements in individual cases if applying the requirements
would result in depriving those they are meant to protect from the
advantages of recognition. In the second sentence, the Court provides
specific examples meant to clarify, but not modify, the rule.
165. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 167 (separate opinion by Dillard, J.).
166. See generally id.
167. Id. at 56, ¶ 125 (alteration in original).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 56, ¶ 125 (alteration in original).
171. See, e.g., Yaël Ronen, Status of Settlers Implanted by Illegal Territorial Regimes, 79 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 194, 233-34 (2008) (locating the origin of these hermeneutical interpretations in the
opinion of the ICJ judges).
172. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 56, ¶ 125.
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Given the humanitarian exception, it may be tempting to conclude that
the above discussion simply clarifies the content of a legal fiction. Whether
a third State is paving a road, building a factory, or even buying goods from
the occupied area, the third party may argue the humanitarian exception
protects its actions. The State will explain that the road, factory, or bought
goods benefit the inhabitants of the occupied territory. The third party will
continue to insist it does not recognize the illegal act, because it only
cooperates with the occupier for “humanitarian reasons.”
This argument overreaches. First, some commentators have read the
phrase, “[i]n general, the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration
of the Territory should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any
advantages derived from international cooperation”173 not as “an exception
to the duty of non-recognition, but rather as a reminder . . . that the
obligation should . . . be interpreted . . . in its context and in the light of its
object and purpose, as a countermeasure against the international crime.”174
Viewed this way, the phrase simply states the obvious; the principle of nonrecognition, like any other principle, should not be applied blindly.175
Second, even when reading the phrase as an exception, this argument
assumes that the international community cannot identify and apply
pressure when the exception is manipulated in bad faith.176 Moreover, this
argument also assumes that international and regional courts will be unable
to evaluate a State’s reliance on the exception.177
These assumptions were challenged by Minister of Agric., Fisheries and
Food, ex parte S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd. and Others (hereinafter
Anastasiou),178 which addressed whether European Union member States
could accept citrus fruits and potatoes produced in the unilaterally-created
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus under the 1972 Association
Agreement between the European Communities and the Republic of
Cyprus.179 The 1972 Association Agreement provided preferences for the
goods shown to originate in Cyprus.180 The Origin Protocol of 1977
clarified that the evidence required to prove the goods originating from
Cyprus was a certificate of origin from Cypriot officials.181 In Anastasiou,
173. Id. (alteration in original).
174. Willem Riphagen (Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on the Content Forms and Degrees of
State Responsibility (Part Two of the Draft Articles), ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/354/Add.2 (May 5, 1982).
175. See id.
176. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 56, ¶¶ 125, 128.
177. See id. at 56, ¶ 125.
178. Case C-432/92, Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food ex parte S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri)
Ltd. and Others, Judgment, 1994 E.C.R. I-3116 (July 5) [hereinafter Anastasiou Judgment].
179. Case C-432/92, Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food ex parte S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri)
Ltd. and Others, Opinion, 1994 E.C.R. I-3091 (Apr. 20) [hereinafter Anastasiou Opinion].
180. Anastasiou Judgment, 1994 E.C.R. at I-3120.
181. Id.
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it was argued that under the Origin Protocol of 1977, “to accept, in
connection with the importation of products originating in Cyprus,
certificates issued by the Turkish community” breakaway republic results in
a clear breach of the Original Protocol because “[t]hose certificates are not
issued by authorities who, under the Association Agreement, are competent
to issue certificates.”182 The United Kingdom and other interested parties
did not dispute that certificates from the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus were not valid under the Association Agreement.183 Instead, they
argued that the “ICJ laid down an ‘interpretative guideline’ [Namibia
exception] which implies that a policy of non-recognition should not lead to
the denial to the population of Cyprus of advantages granted by treaty.”184
The European Court of Justice rejected this argument, stating it “reads too
much into the ICJ’s emphasis on the need to take account of the affected
population’s interests and underestimates the importance of the real
differences between the two situations.”185
Thus, the international
community has been able to temper misuse of the humanitarian
exception.186
4. Applying the Pre-Wall Content
Returning to the hypothetical example of Aggressor’s illegal invasion of
Innocence, the balanced efficacy of the pre-Wall approach becomes clear.187
If an obligation of non-recognition is instituted, three minimum
requirements follow from Observer’s obligation not to recognize the illegal
situation.188 First, Observer is limited in the types of agreements it may
enter into with Aggressor.189 Second, Observer is required to abstain from
sending diplomatic or special missions to the territory under Aggressor’s de
facto control.190 Observer must also clarify that general diplomatic or
consular relations with Aggressor do not imply any recognition of
Aggressor’s illegal act.191 Third, Observer is prohibited from entering into
economic and other forms of relationships concerning the violation that may
entrench the violation.192
182. Anastasiou Opinion, 1994 E.C.R. at I-3103 (alteration in original).
183. Id.
184. Id. at I-3104 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
185. Id. at I-3108.
186. See id. at I-3109.
187. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 54, ¶ 117 (citation omitted).
188. See id. at 55-56, ¶¶ 120-24.
189. See id. at 55, ¶ 122.
190. See id. at 55, ¶ 123.
191. See id.
192. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55-56, ¶ 124. As discussed in Part II, Section B, this
requirement is not available to Talmon, because he incorrectly labels it as an independent obligation.
See supra Part II.B; see also Talmon, supra note 14, at 105-06.
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Qualifying these three requirements is the rule that Observer’s nonrecognition should not deprive the inhabitants of Innocence from receiving
international cooperation.193 Therefore, despite the fact that Observer has
an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation, Observer may be able to
recognize particular acts performed by Aggressor in the occupied
territory.194 For example, Observer could legitimately conclude it may help
fund an Aggressor-run organization that primarily provides health services
to Innocence’s occupied population. If Observer, based on a factual
determination, concludes that funding the organization does not entrench
Aggressor’s violation, no requirement flowing directly from the principle
prevents funding.195 Furthermore, even if Observer concludes that funding
would violate the third requirement, the clarifying provision might allow
funding depending on the facts—such as whether a choice not to fund the
organization would negatively impact Innocence’s occupied population.196
In contrast, the purchase of produce by Observer from Aggressor’s
settlements may be prohibited.197 It is arguable that Aggressor’s sale of
produce is aimed at entrenching its occupation, and Aggressor’s produce
directly competes with produce that Innocence’s occupied population
sells.198 Furthermore, it may be argued that no proceeds from the sale of
settlement produce will reach Innocence’s occupied population.199 In such a
case, not only would Observer’s purchase of the produce violate the third
requirement, but the purchase would also not be protected under the
clarifying rule.200 Whether or not Observer concludes that the three limiting
requirements apply, these hypotheticals demonstrate how Observer’s
decision will be highly fact dependent.201
Despite how fact dependent Observer’s decision is, Observer’s
government, under almost all circumstances, has no obligation to pass laws
preventing private sector entities or its citizens from aiding in the unlawful
invasion or settlement program.202 First, such laws are not derived from the
three requirements that follow from the principle of non-recognition.203
Second, despite Judge Ammoun’s claims to the contrary, the principle of
non-recognition governs inter-governmental relations—not private entities
193. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 56, ¶ 125.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 57, ¶ 129.
196. See id. at 56, ¶ 125.
197. See id. at 55-56, ¶ 124.
198. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55-56, ¶ 124.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 55-56, ¶¶ 124-25.
201. See id. at 50, ¶ 104.
202. See Crawford, supra note 14, at 16, ¶ 39 (“[A] State cannot be responsible for acts conducted
by entities outside its control and outside of its jurisdiction.” (alteration in original)).
203. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55-56, ¶¶ 122-24.
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or citizens’ interactions with States.204 As Judge Dillard observed in a
separate opinion, the Court, in discussing the principle, confines itself to
intergovernmental relations to the exclusion of private dealings.205
It is also clear what the third State, Observer, may do even if an
obligation is not instituted. Absent an authoritative, legal, and factual
determination, Observer may decide whether to invoke the principle of nonrecognition unilaterally in its relations with Aggressor.206 However, in
invoking the principle, Observer only justifies its own actions. Since
Observer’s determination is in lieu of a binding determination, the moderate
approach, unlike the Wall Case, views Observer’s determination as only
affecting Observer’s relationship to Aggressor, but not requiring any other
State to follow Observer’s response.207
III.

THE WALL CASE: AN OBLIGATION ON ALL STATES INDEPENDENT
OF AN AUTHORITATIVE DETERMINATION
Application of the non-recognition principle moved into a new
expansive approach after the Wall Case. With the rise of terrorist attacks in
2000, Israel began to build a security wall in the West Bank.208 In response,
the General Assembly sought an advisory opinion asking:
What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of
the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as
described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the
rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth
204. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 94-95 (separate opinion by Ammoun, J.).
205. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 150 (separate opinion by Dillard, J.) (“[The principle] does not
concern itself with private dealings or the activities directly performed by specialized agencies.”).
206. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 41, ¶ 78. Regional bodies have received considerable
attention recently. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1631, ¶¶ 1-2 (Oct. 17, 2005). This expressed the Security
Council’s determination to take steps to initiate further cooperation between the United Nations and
regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security. Id. at ¶ 1. The Security Council
also took note of the League of Arab States’ call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military
aviation before declaring a no-fly zone. See S.C. Res. 1973 ¶¶ 6-7 (Mar. 17, 2011). Thus, just as order
first calls on States to turn to the Security Council before unilaterally invoking the principle of nonrecognition, order encourages States to see if regional bodies can address the problem before acting on
their own. See id. at ¶ 4. However, regional bodies suffer many of the same limitations of the Security
Council or the ICJ. See id. at ¶ 15. Therefore, the availability of regional bodies does not preclude the
call for unilateral action. See id. at ¶ 21. See generally Michael Akehurst, Enforcement Action by
Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the Organization of American States, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 175 (1967) (discussing just how limited the powers of regional bodies might be under the UN
Charter).
207. Compare Talmon, supra note 14, at 121, with Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 148, 196-97, ¶¶ 26,
146.
208. Victor Kattan, The Legality of the West Bank Wall: Israel’s High Court of Justice v. The
International Court of Justice, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.1425, 1429 (2007).
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Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions?209
A. An Erga Omnes Obligation; A Third Party Self-Standing Obligation
In the Wall Case, the Court broke with its tradition and declared that an
obligation of non-recognition can apply to all States independent of an
authoritative determination.210 First, the Court noted existing prohibitions
on territorial acquisitions by threat or use of force as well as a right of selfdetermination enshrined in the Charter and customary international law.211
Second, the Court stated that, despite Israel’s arguments to the contrary, the
Hague Regulations had become part of customary law, and the Fourth
Geneva Convention as well as the human rights conventions, to which Israel
is a party, all apply within the occupied territories.212 Furthermore, the
Court next ascertained that the construction of the wall violated these
international laws—many of which are obligations erga omnes.213
Referencing Israel’s erga omnes violations, but without identifying an
authoritative body from whose actions an obligation follows, the Court
concluded that “[g]iven the character and the importance of the rights and
obligations involved, the Court is of the view that all States are under an
obligation not to recognize the illegal situation.”214
Judge Higgins’ separate opinion reinforced the conclusion that the
Court relied on the concept of erga omnes obligations rather than Security
Council or ICJ authority to find an obligation of non-recognition.215
Responding to the Court’s reasoning, Judge Higgins protested that, “[t]he
obligation upon United Nations Members of non-recognition and non-

209. Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 141, ¶ 1.
210. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 196, ¶ 146. Prior to the Wall Case and the Namibia Case, Israel
faced considerable condemnation for its actions from other States. See id. at 146, ¶ 20. Furthermore,
prior to the ICJ decision, the Security Council critically assessed South Africa’s actions against Namibia
and Israel’s illegal action in the occupied territory. See S.C. Res. 276, supra note 143, at ¶¶ 1-2
(declaring the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia illegal); see also S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 1 (Nov.
22, 1967) (affirming the importance of withdrawal of Israel from land occupied during the Six Day
War). The distinction drawn between the Namibia Case and the Wall Case in this article does not
depend upon a factual difference existing between these two cases. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 5556, ¶¶ 122-24; see also Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 196, ¶¶ 145-46. The central difference between these
two cases is their method of analysis. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55-56, ¶¶ 122-24; see also Wall
Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 196, ¶¶ 145-46. Thus, even if situations that the ICJ considered in both cases were
more similar than different, this article’s thesis—that the ICJ broke with its tradition—remains correct.
See supra Part I.
211. Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 171-72, ¶¶ 87-88.
212. Id. at 167, 177, ¶¶ 78, 101-02.
213. Id. at 199, ¶ 155.
214. Id. at 200, ¶ 159 (alteration in original).
215. Id. at 216, ¶ 37 (separate opinion by Higgins, J.) (alteration in original).
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assistance does not rest on the notion of erga omnes.”216 For Judge Higgins,
an obligation of non-recognition arises following “a finding of an unlawful
situation by the Security Council” or “the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations,” the ICJ.217 Thus, Judge Higgins’ opinion, critical of the
majority, underscored the majority’s reliance on erga omnes obligations as
opposed to an authoritative determination.218
Without explicitly stating so, the Wall Case altered the nature of the
obligation of non-recognition.219 In the Namibia Case, the ICJ focused on a
Security Council resolution and considered what actions “should be
considered inconsistent with the declaration of illegality and invalidity made
in paragraph 2 of [R]esolution 276 (1970).”220 In contrast, in the Wall Case,
the ICJ focused on the nature of Israel’s violations.221 For the Wall Court,
there was an alternative—establishing an obligation of non-recognition that
creates an obligation absent an authoritative determination.222 This
amendment to the principle of non-recognition presents far more than a new
legal alternative.223
Comparing how States prior to the Wall Case and post-Wall Case
determined when the principle of non-recognition applies confirms the
practical implications of the post-Wall principle of non-recognition. First,
when Aggressor illegally invades Innocence, pre-Wall Case, to determine if
an obligation of non-recognition applies, Observer must determine if there
is a binding determination creating an obligation.224 If some of the most
powerful States condemn Aggressor’s action, but, because of gridlock, no
competent organ of the United Nations issues a binding determination
condemning the act, Observer’s investigation is complete. No obligation
exists.225 However, now post-Wall the obligation does not depend on an
authoritative determination, and so Observer’s investigation is not complete
because an obligation may exist despite the absence of an authoritative
216. Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 217, ¶ 38 (separate opinion by Higgins, J.). Judge Higgins’
comparison of this case to the Namibia Case is troubling, given that advisory opinions are non-binding.
See id. at 157, ¶ 47 (separate opinion by Higgins, J.). Nevertheless, it highlights that Judge Higgins
believes the Court is advocating for an obligation of non-recognition that does not depend upon an
authoritative determination. See id. at 216, ¶ 38 (separate opinion by Higgins, J.).
217. Id. at 216-17, ¶ 38 (separate opinion by Higgins, J.).
218. See id. at 217, ¶ 39 (separate opinion by Higgins, J.).
219. See id. at 216-17, ¶ 38 (separate opinion by Higgins, J.).
220. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55, ¶ 121.
221. See id. at 141, ¶ 1.
222. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 216-17, ¶ 38. It is interesting that Judge Higgins, who argued
that the ICJ should have followed the reasoning of the Namibia Case, turns to the Court’s authority
(instead of the Security Council’s authority) in concluding that an obligation exists. See Wall Case,
2004 I.C.J. at 216, ¶ 38 (separate opinion by Higgins, J.).
223. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 197, ¶¶ 149-50.
224. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 54, ¶ 117 (citation omitted).
225. See id.
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determination.226 Thus, prior to the Wall Case, ascertaining whether an
obligation of non-recognition existed was cut-and-dry.227 A State knew it
had an obligation when an authoritative body declared the principle
applied.228
In contrast, in the Wall Case the Court determined that the obligation of
non-recognition was mandatory absent an authoritative decision.229 The
new self-standing nature of the principle implies that each State determines
whether the principle of non-recognition applies.230 Absent an authoritative
determination of a breach, it is difficult for a State to accurately assess
whether a violation of international law, let alone a serious violation of
international law, has occurred.231 Some States will conclude that the
principle applies, while other States will conclude that the principle does not
apply. Given the self-standing nature of the obligation, States that find an
obligation may see those States who are not executing the three
requirements of non-recognition as violating international law.232 In
contrast, States that find the principle does not apply may view any State
action as voluntary and any attempt to pressure States into applying the
principle as unfriendly action. 233 Disorder may ensue.234
Furthermore, under the Wall Case’s holding, confusion will reign even
among States that agree the principle of non-recognition applies.235 The
three requirements of non-recognition represent the basic requirements that
follow from the principle.236 However, as the Court made clear in the
226. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 197, ¶¶ 149-50.
227. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 54, ¶ 117 (citation omitted).
228. See id.
229. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 197, ¶¶ 149-50.
230. See, e.g., id. at 200, ¶ 159.
231. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55-56, ¶¶ 121-24.
232. See id.
233. See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Comments and Observations Received from Governments,
U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515, at 91 (2001) (presenting Mexico’s concern that third
party countermeasures “would have disruptive effects and would give rise to a series of complex
relationships.”).
234. See Akehurst, supra note 206, at 175. Despite the Wall Case’s holding, massive disorder has
not ensued because non-recognition is costly, and not because others are honoring the principle. See
Kattan, supra note 208, at 1512. For a State to stop trading with a violator means a loss of money. See
id. at 1512. Similarly, cutting diplomatic relations expends political capital and may also lead to a loss
of international business. See Lea Brilmayer & Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet, Third State Obligations and
the Enforcement of International Law, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 38 (2011). In fact, some scholars
have argued that States have generally ignored the ICJ’s decision in the Wall Case because of the cost of
compliance. See, e.g., Kattan, supra note 208, at 1498. Nevertheless, the Wall Case, as a matter of law,
requires intervention that could lead to significant disorder. See generally Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. 136.
Furthermore, as currently expounded upon, the obligation fails to provide the necessary guidance to
make clear when a State abuses the principle due to personal interests. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at
55-56, ¶¶ 122-24.
235. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 196-97, ¶¶ 145-46.
236. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55-56, ¶¶ 122-24.
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Namibia Case, the Security Council remains free to find further obligations
that follow from the principle.237 With States replacing the Security
Council, multiple independent entities may determine if a specific case
warrants lawful requirements beyond the three basic ones.238 As with the
determination that the principle applies, this determination may also not
depend upon an authoritative determination, creating multiple conflicting
claims on States.239 The same problems reoccur in determining when the
principle no longer applies.240
Finally, the pre-Wall cases obligated third party intervention, but only in
the rare situation where an authoritative body determined the principle
applied.241 Looking back at the hypothetical, when Aggressor or Innocence
alone invoked the principle of non-recognition in response to their conflict,
third party States’ responsibilities would remain unaffected. Aggressor’s
relations with State Innocence and State Innocence’s relations with State
Aggressor might be disrupted, but the rest of the international business
community would continue as normal. Only when the Security Council or
the ICJ declared the principle applicable to all States would the obligation
internationalize the dispute.242 Conversely, the Wall Case universalized
conflict by holding that the obligation of non-recognition applies absent an
authoritative determination.243 When Aggressor or Innocence alone invokes
the principle of non-recognition in response to their conflict, third party
States may legally be obligated to enter the conflict.244 Now, in addition to
Aggressor and Innocence’s relationship being disrupted, the rest of the
international business community’s relations with these countries are also
threatened.

237. See id. at 55, ¶ 120.
238. See Akehurst, supra note 206, at 175 (“Some States feared that the United Nations would be
weakened if enforcement action could be taken under regional arrangements, without the authorization
of the Security Council.”).
239. See, e.g., id. at 187-88.
240. See id. One of the problems with the principle of non-recognition leading to so much
disagreement and potential conflict is that many will view the principle with suspicion, even when it is
used for all the right reasons. See Brilmayer & Tesfalidet, supra note 234, at 11. Since proponents of
increasing the number and depth of third party obligations concede that “[t]he degree to which
international law is respected affects the security and stability of all States,” the ICJ should hesitate
before creating a self-standing third party obligation. See id. As China’s delegate to the United Nations
observed that, rather than leading to a stronger international order, allowing individual States to invoke
the principle of non-recognition will “adversely affect the stability of the international legal order.” Int’l
Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/56/SR.11, at ¶ 58 (2001).
241. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. 16.
242. See id. at 53, ¶ 115.
243. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 197, ¶¶ 149-50.
244. See id. at 196-97, ¶ 146.
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B. Content of Obligation
Unlike the Court’s break from precedent in determining the selfstanding nature of the obligation, the Court did not clearly alter the content
of the obligation.245 In stark contrast to the Court’s question in the Namibia
Case, the question presented to the Court in the Wall Case did not
specifically single out the consequence for States.246 Thus, unlike the
Namibia Court, the Wall Court chose not to expound on the content of the
obligation of non-recognition for States.247 Instead, the Court succinctly
observed that all States “are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal
situation resulting from the construction of the wall . . . and not to render aid
or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction.”248
In declaring a dual requirement not to recognize the illegal situation and
not to render aid or assistance, the Court captures the Namibia Case’s three
minimum requirements.249 The Wall Case’s first requirement captures the
Namibia Case’s first two requirements—limitations on the types of formal
agreements States may enter into with the violating State, and abstaining
from sending diplomatic or special missions to the occupied territory.250
Similarly, the Wall Case’s prohibition not to render aid or assistance in
maintaining an illegal situation mirrors the Namibia Case’s prohibition
against entering into economic and other forms of relationships concerning
the violation that may entrench the violation.251 Thus, in declaring an
obligation of non-recognition, the Court provides a dual requirement
consistent with the Namibia Case.252
245.
246.
247.
248.

See id.
See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 17, ¶ 1; see also Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 141, ¶ 1.
See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 17, ¶ 1; see also Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 141, ¶ 1.
Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 196, ¶ 146. The Court goes on to say:

[States] are also under an obligation . . . to see to it that any impediment . . . to the exercise by
the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to an end . . . to ensure
compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.
Id. at 200, ¶ 159 (alteration in original). However, for the Court, these requirements seem to be
additional and unrelated to the obligation of non-recognition. See id.
249. Id.; Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55, ¶¶ 121-23.
250. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 200, ¶ 159; see also Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55, ¶¶ 123-24.
251. Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 200, ¶ 159; Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55-56, ¶ 124.
252. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 200, ¶ 159. However, with no further elaboration on what the
obligation of non-recognition means, Judge Koojimans, who did not vote for the obligation, admits that
in this case he has “great difficulty . . . in understanding what the duty not to recognize an illegal fact
involves.” Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 232, ¶ 44 (separate opinion by Koojimans, J.). Similarly, Talmon,
in passing, concedes that the obligation of non-recognition may have meaningful content when
prohibiting recognition of a new State or the acquisition or occupation of territory, but he also “[has]
great difficultly, however, in understanding what the duty not to recognize an illegal fact [the
construction of the wall] involves.” Talmon, supra note 14, at 104 (alteration in original). The answer
to this question is the extent to which Israel purports to act on behalf of, claims political control over, or
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A PROPOSAL TO ENSURE A MORE EFFECTIVE PRINCIPAL

This section proposes four positions that the international community
should take to enhance the principle of non-recognition. Part A urges the
adoption of the moderate understanding of the principle of non-recognition.
Parts B and C discuss the content of the principle.253 Part B argues that
whether or not a moderate approach is adopted, a conservative interpretation
of the three requirements laid out in the Namibia Case should be
followed.254 Similarly, Part C defends maintaining the Namibia exception
despite Part B’s call to ensure order through clearly defined rules.255
Finally, Part D discusses when the principle is applicable.256
A. Rejecting an Independent Obligation or an Institutionalized
Approach and Adopting the Moderate Approach
During the early efforts to formulate the ILC’s report on the
responsibility of States, multiple rapporteurs, partially due to concern for
order, proposed institutionalizing third party responsibilities.257 However,
the rapporteurs’ suggestions did not come to fruition.258 As Bruno Simma
explains, institutionalization is not a satisfactory approach because it “builds
upon institutions and procedures which are clearly unable to serve as
effective reins on autodetermination.”259 The Wall Case moved in the
opposite direction, holding that when a State violates an erga omnes
obligation to which the principle of non-recognition applies, the principle is
obligatory even absent an authoritative determination.260 As discussed in
Part III, Section A, this move creates its own problems.261
involves itself economically with the territory illegally affected by the wall, thereby defining the bite of
the obligation. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55-56, ¶¶ 122, 124.
253. See infra Parts IV.A-C.
254. See infra Part IV.B.
255. See infra Parts IV.B-C.
256. See infra Part IV.D.
257. See R. Ago, Obligations Erga Omnes and the International Community, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES OF STATE 237, 238 (Joseph H. H. Weiler et al. eds., 1989). The Court’s grounding of the
legality of the principle of non-recognition in the Namibia Case on the Security Council’s actions,
despite the action not being justified under Article VII, suggests that the Court was sympathetic to this
approach. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 52, ¶ 112. Judge Higgins’ opinion in the Wall Case reveals
that this sympathy remains relevant today. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 207, ¶ 2 (separate opinion by
Higgins, J.).
258. See, e.g, Bruno Simma, Bilateralism and Community Interest in the Law of State
Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI
ROSENNE 821, 836-37 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989).
259. Id. at 837. In 1985, Special Rapporteur Riphagen, Simma’s main target, only had to consider
the possibility of States unilaterally applying the principle; however, one may extend his reasoning to a
self-executing principle. See id. at 836-37.
260. Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 171-72, ¶ 88.
261. See supra Part III.A.
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The moderate approach, as its name suggests, falls in between these two
legal positions. By allowing individual States to decide if the principle
applies, the moderate approach, like the Wall Case, strongly rejects
institutionalizing non-recognition.262 However, unlike the Wall Case, the
moderate approach does not require every serious violation to be
internationalized.263 Instead, the moderate approach holds two central
positions.
First, absent an authoritative legal and factual determination, States may
decide whether to invoke the principle.264 Compared with the attempts to
institutionalize third party intervention, this approach frees third parties to
act.265 For example, when Aggressor violates the rights of Innocence,
justice demands Innocence be able to right the wrong, and the moderate
approach allows Observer to aid Innocence. However, recognizing the
disorder that might result from requiring every relevant conflict to be
internationalized, the moderate approach allows Observer and all other
states to intervene, but does not require those states to do so.266
Second, the moderate approach maintains that since individual States
invoke the principle, the invocation does not have an impact on third
parties. In other words, after considering a conflict between Aggressor and
Innocence, Observer may determine the principle applies to Aggressor’s
actions. However, since Observer’s determination is in lieu of a binding
determination, Observer’s determination only affects Observer’s
relationship to Aggressor.
This aspect of the moderate approach prevents the principle of nonrecognition from over reaching. As noted above, many scholars relying on
the idea of ex injuria jus non oritur, or some other version of the idea, argue
that when Aggressor violates the rights of Innocence, Observer has an

262. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 178-80, ¶¶ 108-09, 112.
263. See id. at 200, ¶ 159.
264. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 41, ¶ 78. Regional bodies have received considerable
attention recently. S.C. Res. 1631, supra note 206, at ¶ 2. This expressed the Security Council’s
determination to take steps to initiate further cooperation between the United Nations and regional
organizations in maintaining international peace and security. Id. at ¶ 1. The Security Council took note
of the League of Arab States’ call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation before
declaring a no fly zone. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 206, at ¶ 4. Thus, just as order first calls on States to
turn to the Security Council before unilaterally invoking the principle of non-recognition, order
encourages States to see if regional bodies can address the problem before acting on their own. See id. at
¶ 15. However, regional bodies suffer many of the limitations of the Security Council or the ICJ. See id.
at ¶ 21. Therefore, the availability of regional bodies does not preclude the call for unilateral action. See
id. at ¶ 8. For a discussion of just how limited the powers of regional bodies might be under the United
Nations Charter, see generally Akehurst, supra note 206.
265. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 206, at ¶ 4.
266. Considering intervention to be permitted or even praiseworthy, but not mandatory, should not
appear strange. Many actions in our daily lives are permitted or encouraged, but are not mandatory.
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obligation to respond.267 Though championing third party obligations,
scholars hesitate to take the next logical step and conclude that when
Observer fails to respond, Observer 2, another third party state, should also
have an obligation to respond to Observer’s violation.268 However, once the
third party principle of non-recognition obligations acquires firm grounding
in the international community, this seems to be the next logical step.269
The moderate approach anticipates and prevents this move by explaining
that States may unilaterally invoke the principle, but the invocation has no
effect on other States’ obligations.
Since the moderate approach does not require third-party intervention, it
may be argued that the approach does not institute an effective enforcement
mechanism. The power of this critique cannot be denied; however, several
facts soften its effect. First, the moderate approach does not create a legal
stumbling block to third party enforcement. In fact, by allowing third party
intervention, the approach legally facilitates such intervention. What
prevents intervention is a lack of will. Second, and related, declaring an
obligation by itself can maximally create a legal obligation to intervene. A
State’s predilection not to intervene (and therefore, failure to intervene)
would remain the same.
Third, recognizing that States may apply the principal in a biased
manner, the moderate approach limits the effect of an individual State’s
invocation. “[A] copycat or mimetic dynamic in modern international law
has taken shape whenever an enhancement of state power has become
available . . . .”270 Therefore, while it may be assumed that even if those
States that initially advocated for an obligation of non-recognition—absent
an authoritative determination—had altruistic intentions, inevitably less
altruistic States will use such a principle for self-interested reasons. In fact,
a third State willing to invest resources in a disagreement between two
States, both of which accuse the other of violating international law, is
likely to be a State that has an interest in the disagreement. With the
inevitability that some States will use the opportunity to require all other
States to abide by the principle for purposes contrary to the reason behind
broadening the principle, limiting States’ ability to invoke the principle
becomes consistent with the principle’s goals. Thus, the moderate approach
provides a system that protects order without stripping States of the
enforcement mechanism granted to them in the Wall Case.271
267. See supra Part II.A.3.
268. See supra Part II.A.3.
269. See supra Part II.A.3.
270. W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive
Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 525, 525 (2006) (alteration in original).
271. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 195, ¶ 141.
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B. The Namibia Case’s Three Basic Requirements
The Namibia Case arms the moderate approach with three minimum
negative requirements that follow from an obligation of non-recognition.272
Despite Judge Ammoun’s arguments for additional requirements, the
Court’s three requirements build a logical floor that may be added to by the
Security Council, or other authoritative bodies, rather than random states.273
1. The Benefits of the Namibia Case’s Requirements
The Namibia Case’s requirements are appropriate because the object of
non-recognition is to prevent the validation of an illegal act, and all three of
the Namibia Advisory Opinion’s requirements prevent validating illegal
acts.274 Furthermore, whether the moderate approach or the Wall Case
approach is endorsed, States will in either case be permitted to intervene in
the conflicts of other States.275 In intervening, States must determine how
the principle applies. Without clear guidance, it is likely that conflicting
judgments and enforcement orders will arise. By providing three defined
requirements, the Namibia Case addresses this need.276 If State A commits
a serious violation against State B, and States C and D decide to respond,
States C and D need not argue over how to respond. The Namibia Case
requirements provide guidance.277 In addition, while it must be conceded
that the instructions cannot prevent purposeful misinterpretation, they do
expose such deviation, making it more difficult for opportunists to misapply
the principle.278
2. A Balanced Approach
The power to add to the three basic requirements of the obligation of
non-recognition should only be granted to authoritative bodies. From a
practical perspective, this interpretation should be preferred.
This
interpretation limits States’ enforcement power, but it still leaves a strong
enforcement mechanism. The interpretation creates a balance that respects
both the needs and risks of serious intervention. Alternatively, State power
to determine if the obligation of non-recognition applies can extend to a
272. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 56, ¶ 125.
273. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 97, ¶ 16 (separate opinion by Ammoun, J.).
274. See LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION, supra note 8, at 133; see also Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J.
at 55, ¶¶ 121-23.
275. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 196-97, ¶ 146.
276. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55, ¶¶ 121-23.
277. See id.
278. See id. For similar reasons, States or the ICJ should clearly adopt Judges Dillard and de
Castros’ conservative understanding of the three requirements. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J.
138 (separate opinion by Dillard, J.); Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. 158 (separate opinion by de Castro, J.).
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determination of whether additional requirements are necessary. Such an
interpretation would greatly expand third party powers to intervene,
expanding the risk of conflict without sufficient checks.
Legally, even after the Wall Case, the limitation can be justified if one
interprets the Wall Case’s finding that States can determine if the principle
is applicable to all States as not changing the fact that, “[t]he precise
determination of the acts permitted or allowed . . . lies within the
competence of the appropriate political organs of the United Nations . . .
.”279 Thus, case law and practical considerations both support allowing only
proper authoritative bodies to add to the three requirements.280
C. Maintaining the Clarifying Rule
In light of the moderate approach’s grant of power to States, the
Namibia Case clarifying rule—which can free States from specific
requirements in the interest of not harming the aggrieved population—
should remain in effect.281 The clarifying rule legally prevents States from
ignoring that the principle of non-recognition may adversely impact those
directly harmed by the violation of international law.282 With individual
third parties enforcing the law, this reminder becomes all the more
important.283 Furthermore, while the clarifying rule may be abused,
removing the rule would not prevent States from acting as if the rule
persists.284 In protecting those who are directly impacted by the violation,
the rule embodies an especially moral flavor.285 Absent the legal rule,
States can and will simply invoke the moral high ground to justify their
actions.286 The primary difference absent the rule will be that the law will
no longer direct States’ real or pretended moral inclinations in a way that
avoids punishing the already suffering population.287 The clarifying rule
thus has a close relationship with the three Namibia Case requirements as
applied in the moderate approach.288

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 55, ¶ 120 (alteration in original).
See id.
See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 56, ¶ 125.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 56, ¶ 125.
See id.
See id.
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D. When the Principle Should Apply
If States are to determine when to invoke the principle of nonrecognition, the Court’s actions provide insufficient guidance as to when the
principle of non-recognition applies.289 Maximally, the principle of nonrecognition may be applied when a serious breach of an erga omnes
obligation occurs, but States may argue that the principle can only be
invoked by a State in a situation where the Security Council or the ICJ has
already adopted the principle for the type of violation in question.290 While
these two possibilities provide considerable guidance to States, they still
require States to choose between the two interpretations.291
If the international community decides that the principle may apply
when a serious breach of an erga omnes obligation occurs, a further
problem arises. Since proclaiming the concept of erga omnes obligations in
Barcelona Traction,292 the Court has adopted an enigmatic approach to
explain how to identify an erga omnes obligation.293 For example, in the
Wall Case, the Court discussed the erga omnes obligations of selfdetermination and “certain . . . international humanitarian law.”294 In
explaining how it determined these obligations were erga omnes, the Court
cited the Case Concerning East Timor295 and the advisory opinion Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.296 However, these precedents
barely provide any more guidance as to why one obligation is erga omnes
while another is not.297 Academic sources provide more elaboration but
little consensus. This lack of guidance has led a noted scholar, expressing
the frustration of many, to write that he “was not certain as to how various
norms entered into the magic erga omnes circle.”298
Ambiguity is the enemy of a well-functioning system, and without clear
rules on when the principle will apply, States will inevitably disagree about

289. See, e.g., id. at 97-98, ¶ 16 (separate opinion by Ammoun, J.).
290. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 199, ¶ 157.
291. See id.; see also Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 97-98, ¶ 16 (separate opinion by Ammoun, J.).
292. Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co., (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32, ¶ 33
(Feb. 5).
293. See IAN D SEIDERMAN, HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE HUMAN RIGHTS
DIMENSION 123 (2001).
294. Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 199, ¶ 155.
295. See id. at 199, ¶ 156 (citing East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 102, ¶ 29).
296. See Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. at 199, ¶¶ 156-57 (citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons (United Nations), Case, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 273, ¶ 23 (July 8)).
297. See East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. 90 at 102, ¶ 29; see also Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.C.J. 226
at 273-74, ¶ 23.
298. Symposium, The Future of International Law Enforcement: New Scenarios—New Law?, 115
KIEL INST. OF INT’L L. 9, 170 (1992).
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invoking the principle.299 Less than altruistic States will try to misuse the
ambiguity to their advantage. Once the definition of an erga omnes
violation becomes more concrete, it may be appropriate to apply the
principle whenever a serious breach of an erga omnes obligation occurs.
However, given the failure of the erga omnes concept to provide States with
needed guidance at this time, and given the potential consequences of this
failure, the principle should only be invoked by a State in a situation where
the Security Council or the ICJ has already adopted the principle.
V.

CONCLUSION

The above analysis demonstrates that the principle of non-recognition
has developed to guide States regarding the content and applicability of the
principle.300 However, new developments potentially threaten the stability
of the international community.301 This Article suggests steps that protect
world order while allowing States to apply the principle of non-recognition
for the enhanced advancement of international justice.

299. Though ambiguity is often the cost of action in this case, as demonstrated above, it need not
be. See East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 102, ¶ 29; see also Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.C.J. at 273-74, ¶
23.
300. See supra Part III.
301. See supra Part IV.
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